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A “PLAUSIBLE” SHOWING AFTER
BELL ATLANTIC CORP. V. TWOMBLY
Charles B. Campbell*
The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly1 is creating quite a stir.  Suddenly gone is the famous loosey-goosey
rule of Conley v. Gibson “that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure
to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no
set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”2  Now a
complaint must provide “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.”3  Decided in 2007, Bell Atlantic was cited in over 6,000 cases in
just its first year.4
Already being described as a landmark decision,5 Bell Atlantic nonethe-
less has lawyers and judges scratching their heads over the precise pleading
standard to apply in its wake.  As the Second Circuit (mildly) put it, “Consider-
able uncertainty concerning the standard for assessing the adequacy of plead-
ings has recently been created by the Supreme Court’s decision in Bell Atlantic
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J.D., 1993, University of Virginia; B.S., 1988, Auburn University.
1 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007).
2 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957), abrogated by Bell Atl. Corp., 127 S. Ct. at
1968–69.
3 Bell Atl. Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 1974.
4 Search of Westlaw’s Keycite service conducted June 9, 2008, restricting search to judicial
opinions dated before May 21, 2008.  This figure includes citations in both opinions for the
court and in separate opinions by individual judges.  By way of comparison, the Court’s
major abortion decision of 2007, Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007), was cited in
only 39 cases in its first year. Cf. Michael C. Dorf, The Supreme Court Wreaks Havoc in the
Lower Federal Courts—Again, FINDLAW’S WRIT, Aug. 13, 2007, http://writ.news.findlaw.
com/dorf/20070813.html (using earlier figures).  For an empirical analysis of district court
cases citing Bell Atlantic in the context of FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, see
Kendall W. Hannon, Note, Much Ado About Twombly? A Study of the Impact of Bell Atlan-
tic Corp. v. Twombly on 12(b)(6) Motions, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1811 (2008).
5 Janet L. McDavid & Eric Stock, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, NAT’L L.J., July 30, 2007, at
12.  See also Andre´e Sophia Blumstein, A Higher Standard:  ‘Twombly’ Requires More for
Notice Pleading, TENN. B.J., Aug. 2007, at 12 (“Of all the cases decided this term by the
United States Supreme Court, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly may be the case of the most
practical, everyday significance.”); John Sarratt, Mr. Micawber’s Bad Day:  Is Notice Plead-
ing Dead?, N.C. LAW. WKLY., July 2, 2007; Dorf, supra note 4. R
1
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Corp. v. Twombly.”6  Just what is a plausible “showing that the pleader is enti-
tled to relief” under Rule 8(a)(2)?7
I believe an answer lies in the 27-year-old decision of the Former Fifth
Circuit in In re Plywood Antitrust Litigation.8 Plywood Antitrust requires, at a
minimum, that “a complaint . . . contain either direct or inferential allegations
respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain a recovery under some
viable legal theory.”9  Already used in more than half the circuits,10 this stan-
dard paraphrases advice found in Professors Wright and Miller’s venerable
Federal Practice and Procedure for nearly forty years.11  Properly applied, this
“all . . . material elements” standard12 satisfies Bell Atlantic’s “plausibility”
requirement in all respects.
The Plywood Antitrust pleading standard works well after Bell Atlantic,
first, because the Supreme Court referred to the standard, albeit parenthetically,
with approval in Bell Atlantic.13  Second, the standard does much to harmonize
the Federal Rules’ goal of dispensing with pleading technicalities while still
requiring enough general factual information about a pleader’s claim to make
the notice in “notice pleading” meaningful.  Finally, and perhaps most impor-
tantly, it gives lawyers, litigants, and courts a standard they can actually use
when drafting or assessing the sufficiency of pleadings.
6 Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 155 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. granted sub nom. Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
128 S. Ct. 2931 (June 16, 2008) (No. 07-1015). See also Allan Ides, Bell Atlantic and the
Principle of Substantive Sufficiency Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2):  Toward
a Structured Approach to Federal Pleading Practice, 243 F.R.D. 604, 604 nn. 3, 4 (2006)
(noting confusion); A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431
(2008); Thomas P. Brown & Christine C. Wilson, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly: A Tec-
tonic Shift in Pleading Standards (or Just a Tremor)?, LEGAL BACKGROUNDER, Aug. 24,
2007, available at http://www.wlf.org/upload/08-24-07wilson.pdf; Scott Dodson, Pleading
Standards After Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 93 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 135, 138 (2007), http://
www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2007/07/09/dodson.pdf.  As the Reporter to the Advi-
sory Committee on Civil Rules put it, “One phrase or another [in Bell Atlantic] can be made
to point in almost any direction.”  Edward H. Cooper, Notice Pleading:  The Agenda After
Twombly 3 (2007) in Agenda Materials, Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Washington,
D.C., November 8–9, 2007, 268, 270, http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Agenda%20Books/
CV2007-11.pdf.
7 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
8 In re Plywood Antitrust Litig., 655 F.2d 627 (5th Cir. Unit A Sept. 1981), cert. dismissed
sub. nom Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Lyman Lamb Co., 462 U.S. 1125 (1983).
9 Id. at 641. (emphasis omitted).
10 See infra notes 212-19 and accompanying text.
11 See infra notes 187–92 and accompanying text.
12 See Plywood Antitrust, 655 F.2d at 641.
13 See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1969 (2007) (quoting Car Carriers, Inc.
v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 1984), in turn quoting Sutliff, Inc. v.
Donovan Cos., 727 F.2d 648, 654 (7th Cir. 1984), in turn quoting Plywood Antitrust, 655
F.2d at 641).
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I. BELL ATLANTIC CORP. V. TWOMBLY
In Bell Atlantic, plaintiffs alleged that the “Baby Bells,”14 also known as
Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers (ILECs), were violating section 1 of the
Sherman Act15 in two ways.  First, plaintiffs alleged that the ILECs had
“‘engaged in parallel conduct’ in their respective service areas to inhibit the
growth of upstart” competitors known as “competitive local exchange carriers”
(CLECs), having been “naturally led to form a conspiracy” by “‘compelling
common motivatio[n].’”16  Second, the ILECs had allegedly entered into
“agreements . . . to refrain from competing against one another.”17
The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim18
because the complaint contained no facts showing that the ILECs’ conduct was
the product of unlawful conspiracy as opposed to lawful “parallel conduct.”19
On appeal, the Second Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and
remanded the case for discovery.20  The court of appeals applied as part of its
standard of review Conley v. Gibson’s rule that “[a] complaint should not be
dismissed for failure to state a claim ‘unless it appears beyond doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle
him to relief.’”21  The court concluded that “plus factors are not required to be
pleaded to permit an antitrust claim based on parallel conduct to survive dis-
missal.”22  The court of appeals acknowledged that “the pleaded factual predi-
cate must include conspiracy among the realm of ‘plausible’ possibilities in
order to survive a motion to dismiss,” but concluded that “to rule that allega-
tions of parallel anticompetitive conduct fail to support a plausible conspiracy
claim, a court would have to conclude that there is no set of facts that would
permit a plaintiff to demonstrate that the particular parallelism asserted was the
product of collusion rather than coincidence.”23
The Supreme Court began its analysis with a concise statement of the
substantive question under section 1 of the Sherman Act.  Since section 1 only
penalizes restraints of trade that are the product of “‘contract, combination, or
conspiracy,’” the critical issue in Bell Atlantic was “whether the challenged
anticompetitive conduct ‘stem[s] from independent decision or from an agree-
14 BellSouth Corp., Qwest Communications International, Inc., SBC Communications, Inc.,
and Verizon Communications, Inc. (the successor-in-interest to Bell Atlantic Corp.) Id. at
1962 n.1.
15 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).  Section 1 of the Sherman Act forbids any agreement or conspiracy
in restraint of interstate or foreign trade.
16 Bell Atl. Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 1962 (quoting Consolidated Amended Class Action Com-
plaint ¶¶ 47 & 50, Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 313 F. Supp. 2d 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (No.
02 Civ. 10220(GEL))).
17 Id.
18 See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
19 Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 313 F. Supp. 2d 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), vacated, 425 F.3d 99
(2d Cir. 2005), rev’d, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007).
20 Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 425 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2005), rev’d, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007).
21 Twombly, 425 F.3d. at 106 (quoting Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 197–98 (2d Cir.
2001), in turn quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957)).
22 Id. at 114, quoted in Bell Atl. Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1963.
23 Id., quoted in Bell Atl. Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 1963.
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ment, tacit or express.’”24  Although parallel conduct can be used as circum-
stantial evidence of an agreement, it is not enough by itself to establish an
agreement or violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.25  “Even ‘conscious
parallelism’ . . . is ‘not in itself unlawful’” under Supreme Court precedent.26
This is so because “parallel conduct or interdependence, without more” is
essentially ambiguous—equally consistent with unlawful conspiracy, on the
one hand, or lawful, unilateral business conduct in response to common market
conditions, on the other.27
The Court accordingly observed that it had “hedged against false infer-
ences from identical behavior at a number of points in the trial sequence,” such
as holding evidence of only parallel conduct as insufficient to support a plain-
tiff’s motion for directed verdict, requiring proof of conspiracy to “include evi-
dence tending to exclude the possibility of independent action,” and requiring a
plaintiff to offer such evidence in order to survive summary judgment.28
The Court then turned to “the antecedent question of what a plaintiff must
plead in order to state a claim under §1 of the Sherman Act.”29  The Court
began by using Conley v. Gibson to define the requirements of Rule 8(a)(2),
noting that the Rule “requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair
notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’”30
Acknowledging that the Rules do not require a complaint to contain “detailed
factual allegations,” the Court observed that “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide
the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and con-
clusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not
do.”31  The Court concluded that “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise
a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the alle-
gations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).”32
Justice Souter, writing for the majority, rejected Justice Stevens’s sugges-
tion “that the Federal Rules somehow dispensed with the pleading of facts alto-
gether,” as “greatly oversimplif[ying] matters.”33  Although Rule 8 did away
with detailed pleading of facts “for most types of cases,” the Court noted that
24 Bell Atl. Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 1964 (quoting Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube
Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 775 (1984) and Theatre Enters., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp.,
346 U.S. 537, 540 (1954)).
25 Id. (citing Theatre Enters., 346 U.S. at 540–41).
26 Id. (quoting Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209,
227 (1993)).
27
  Id. (citing RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, MOTIONS TO DISMISS ANTITRUST CASES:  SEPARATING
FACT FROM FANTASY, 3–4 (AEI-Brookings Joint Ctr. for Regulatory Studies, Related Publi-
cations 06-08 2006). Also available at http://www.regmarkets.org/publications/
abstract.php?pid=1059.
28 Id. (citing Theatre Enters., 346 U.S. at 537; Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465
U.S. 752 (1984); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986)).
29 Id.
30 Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
31 Id. at 1964-65 (citations omitted).
32 Id. at 1965 (citation and footnote omitted).
33 Id. at 1965 n.3 (responding to Justice Stevens’ dissent at 1979). This summary of the
dissent’s argument was itself something of an oversimplification, because Justice Stevens
acknowledged in response to the Court’s footnote three that “[w]hether and to what extent
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“Rule 8(a)(2) still requires a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of enti-
tlement to relief.”34  The Court concluded that, “[w]ithout some factual allega-
tion in the complaint,” it was difficult to see how a plaintiff could satisfy
Conley’s requirement to provide the “‘grounds’ on which the claim rests.”35
The Court then applied “these general standards” to a claim under section
1 of the Sherman Act, “hold[ing] that stating such a claim requires a complaint
with enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest that an agreement was
made.”36  The Court characterized this requirement as “[a]sking for plausible
grounds to infer an agreement,” but stressed that it did “not impose a
probability requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls for enough fact to
raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal
agreement.”37  According to the Court, because “lawful parallel conduct fails to
bespeak unlawful agreement . . . an allegation of parallel conduct and a bare
assertion of conspiracy will not suffice.”38
The Court thought that requiring “allegations plausibly suggesting (not
merely consistent with) agreement reflects the threshold requirement of Rule
8(a)(2) that the ‘plain statement’ possess enough heft to ‘sho[w] that the
pleader is entitled to relief.’”39  In the antitrust context, an allegation of con-
scious parallel conduct, “without that further circumstance pointing toward a
meeting of the minds” to suggest an unlawful conspiracy or agreement, leaves
the defendant’s conduct in “neutral territory,” and “stops short of the line
between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitle[ment] to relief.’”40
Justice Souter expressed deep concern about permitting a complaint that
did not allege “entitle[ment] to relief” as required by Rule 8(a)(2) to proceed
nonetheless to discovery.41  According to the Court, “it is one thing to be cau-
tious before dismissing an antitrust complaint in advance of discovery, but
quite another to forget that proceeding to antitrust discovery can be expen-
sive.”42  The Court cited the size of the putative class and the size of defendants
as making the “potential expense . . . obvious enough in the present case.”43
The Court rejected the dissent’s suggestion that groundless claims could “be
weeded out early in the discovery process through ‘careful case management
. . . .’”
44
 The Court concluded that it was “[p]robably . . . only by taking care
to require allegations that reach the level suggesting conspiracy that we can
hope to avoid the potentially enormous expense of discovery in cases with no
that ‘showing’ [of entitlement to relief under Rule 8] requires allegations of fact will depend
on the particulars of the claim.” Id. at 1979 n.6 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
34 Id. (quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at 47).
35 Id.
36 Id. at 1965 (majority opinion).
37 Id.
38 Id. at 1966.
39 Id.
40 Id.  One commentator has described the Court’s analysis as creating “three zones of
pleading” which he illustrates and describes at some length. See Spencer, supra note 6, at R
448–50.
41 Bell Atl. Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 1966-67.
42 Id. (citation omitted).
43 Id. at 1967.
44 Id. (quoting id. at 1975 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
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‘“reasonably founded hope that the [discovery] process will reveal relevant evi-
dence”’ to support a § 1 claim.”45
Plaintiffs’ principal attack on “the plausibility standard at the pleading
stage” was “its ostensible conflict with”46 Conley v. Gibson’s “no set of facts”
standard.47  The Court noted that this language could “be read in isolation as
saying that any statement revealing the theory of the claim will suffice unless
its factual impossibility may be shown from the face of the pleadings” and
concluded that the Second Circuit had “read Conley in some such way . . . .”48
Criticizing such an approach, the Court observed that, “[o]n such a focused and
literal reading of Conley’s ‘no set of facts,’ a wholly conclusory statement of
claim would survive a motion to dismiss whenever the pleadings left open the
possibility that a plaintiff might later establish some ‘set of [undisclosed] facts’
to support recovery.”49  The Court thought that such an “approach to pleading
would dispense with any showing of a ‘“reasonably founded hope”’ that a
plaintiff would be able to make a case; Mr. Micawber’s optimism would be
enough.”50
The Court then noted that, “[s]eeing this, a good many judges and com-
mentators have balked at taking the literal terms of the Conley passage as a
pleading standard.”51  It cited four court of appeals cases52 and two articles by
leading legal scholars.53  The Court found “no need to pile up further citations
to show that Conley’s ‘no set of facts’ language has been questioned, criticized,
and explained away long enough.”54  Accordingly, the Court ruled that, “after
puzzling the profession for 50 years, this famous observation has earned its
retirement.”55  It advised that “[t]he phrase is best forgotten as an incomplete,
negative gloss on an accepted pleading standard:  once a claim has been stated
adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the
allegations in the complaint.”56  The Court thus characterized the “no set of
facts” language as a description of “the breadth of opportunity to prove what an
45 Id. (quoting Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005)).
46 Id. at 1968.
47 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957), quoted in Bell Atl. Corp., 127 S. Ct. at
1968.
48 Bell Atl. Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 1968.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 1969 (quoting Dura Pharms., 544 U.S. at 347, in turn quoting Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, at 741 (1975)).  “Mr. Micawber” is a reference to Wilkins
Micawber, “a character in Dickens’s novel ‘David Copperfield’, applied gen[erally] to a
feckless optimist with a habit of ‘waiting for something to turn up.’”  9 THE OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 711 (2d ed. 1989); see CHARLES DICKENS, DAVID COPPERFIELD 860-
63 (Oxford University Press 1999) (1850).
51 Bell Atl. Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 1969.
52 Id. (citing Ascon Props., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1155 (9th Cir. 1989);
McGregor v. Indus. Excess Landfill, Inc. 856 F.2d 39, 42–43 (6th Cir. 1988); Car Carriers,
Inc., v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 1984); O’Brien v. DiGrazia, 544 F.2d
543, 546 n.3 (1st Cir. 1976)).
53 Id. (citing Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., From Whom No Secrets Are Hid, 76 TEX. L. REV.
1665, 1685 (1998); Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 463–65 (1986)).
54 Id. at 1969.
55 Id.
56 Id.
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adequate complaint claims, not the minimum standard of adequate pleading to
govern a complaint’s survival.”57
Having thus “interred”58 Conley’s “no set of facts” language, the Court
applied its “plausibility” requirement to the amended complaint filed by the
Bell Atlantic plaintiffs, and found it wanting.59  The Court thought “that noth-
ing contained in the complaint invests either the action or inaction alleged with
a plausible suggestion of conspiracy.”60  It noted that, “[a]part from identifying
a seven-year span in which the §1 violations were supposed to have occurred
. . . , the pleadings mentioned no specific time, place or person involved in the
alleged conspiracies.”61  According to the Court,
This lack of notice contrasts sharply with the model form for pleading negligence,
Form 9, which the dissent says exemplifies the kind of “bare allegation” that survives
a motion to dismiss.  Whereas the model form alleges that the defendant struck the
plaintiff with his car while plaintiff was crossing a particular highway at a specified
date and time, the complaint here furnishes no clue as to which of the four ILECs
(much less which of their employees) supposedly agreed, or when and where the
illicit agreement took place.  A defendant wishing to prepare an answer in the simple
fact pattern laid out in Form 9 would know what to answer; a defendant seeking to
respond to plaintiffs’ conclusory allegations in the § 1 context would have little idea
where to begin.62
The Court also rejected the plaintiffs’ contention that its plausibility analy-
sis was contrary to its unanimous decision in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.63  In
Swierkiewicz, the Court held that “a complaint in an employment discrimina-
tion lawsuit [need not] contain specific facts establishing a prima facie case of
discrimination under the framework set forth . . . in McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green.”64  The Court approved the district court’s understanding that
“‘Swierkiewicz did not change the law of pleading, but simply re-emphasized
. . . that the Second Circuit’s use of a heightened pleading standard for Title VII
cases was contrary to the Federal Rules’ structure of liberal pleading require-
ments.’”65  The Court noted that the Second Circuit had rejected
Swierkiewicz’s complaint “for failing to allege certain additional facts that [he]
would need at the trial stage to support his claim in the absence of direct evi-
dence of discrimination.”66  This requirement of pleading additional facts—
facts that would not be necessary if Swierkiewicz had direct evidence of dis-
crimination—“amounted to a heightened pleading requirement by insisting that
57 Id. (emphasis added).
58 Id. at 1978 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
59 Id. at at 1970–74.
60 Id. at 1971.  As the Court put it elsewhere, “the complaint does not set forth a single fact
in a context that suggests an agreement.” Id. at 1968–69.
61 Id. at 1970 n.10.
62 Id. at 1971 n.10 (citing id. at 1977 (Stevens, J., dissenting)). See FED. R. CIV. P., Form 9,
Complaint for Negligence, 28 U.S.C. app. 285 (2006) (amended 2007).
63 Bell Atl. Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 1973; Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 507
(2006).
64 Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 508 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973)), quoted in Bell Atl. Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 1973.
65 Bell Atl. Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 1973 (quoting Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 313 F. Supp. 2d
174, 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)).
66 Id. (emphasis added) (citing Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 514).
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[he] allege ‘specific facts’ beyond those necessary to state his claim and the
grounds showing entitlement to relief.”67
The majority further rejected any suggestion that its opinion embraced
“heightened pleading,” asserting that it did “not require heightened fact plead-
ing of specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.”68  The Court reversed the Second Circuit, holding that dismissal
was necessary “[b]ecause the plaintiffs here have not nudged their claims
across the line from conceivable to plausible . . . .”69
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg (except as to Part IV), wrote a
lengthy dissent.70  Rehearsing the history of common-law and code pleading
technicalities,71 Justice Stevens regarded the Court’s decision as a fundamental
departure from the philosophy of notice pleading embodied in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.  “Under the relaxed pleading standards of the Federal
Rules, the idea was not to keep litigants out of court but rather to keep them in.
The merits of a claim would be sorted out during a flexible pretrial process and,
as appropriate, through the crucible of trial.”72  Quoting Charles E. Clark, the
“principal draftsman”73 of the Federal Rules, Justice Stevens noted:
Experience has shown . . . that we cannot expect the proof of the case to be made
through the pleadings, and that such proof is really not their function.  We can expect
a general statement distinguishing the case from all others, so that the manner and
form of trial and remedy expected are clear, and so that a permanent judgment will
result.74
For Justice Stevens, Conley v. Gibson’s “no set of facts” standard was
hardly “puzzling,” as the Court had suggested.75  Rather, “[i]t reflects a philos-
ophy that, unlike in the days of code pleading, separating the wheat from the
chaff is a task assigned to the pretrial and trial process. Conley’s language, in
short, captures the policy choice embodied in the Federal Rules and binding on
the federal courts.”76  He concluded that the Court’s new “‘plausibility’ stan-
dard is irreconcilable with Rule 8 and with our governing precedents.  As we
made clear in Swierkiewicz and Leatherman, fear of the burdens of litigation
does not justify factual conclusions supported only by lawyers’ arguments
rather than sworn denials or admissible evidence.”77
The dissent noted that the plaintiffs had expressly alleged agreement or
conspiracy on the part of the Baby Bells three times in their complaint.78  He
67 Id. at 1973-74 (citing Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 508).
68 Id. at 1974.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 1974 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The slip opinion of Justice Stevens’s dissent is four
pages longer than the opinion of the Court.
71 Id. at  1975 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
72 Id. at 1976.
73 Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 283 (1988).
74 Bell Atl. Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 1976 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Charles E. Clark, The
New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:  The Last Phase—Underlying Philosophy Embodied
in Some of the Basic Provisions of the New Procedure, 23 A.B.A. J. 976, 977 (1937)).
75 Id. at 1981 (quoting id. at 1969).
76 Id. at 1981.
77 Id. at 1983.
78 Id. at 1984.
\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\9-1\NVJ102.txt unknown Seq: 9  3-MAR-09 14:38
Fall 2008] A “PLAUSIBLE” SHOWING 9
accused the Court of “circumvent[ing] this obvious obstacle to dismissal by
pretending that it does not exist.”79  Moreover, Justice Stevens could not agree
with the Court that an agreement by the Baby Bells not to compete with each
other and to hinder competition from CLECs was not “plausible.”80  He sug-
gested that an appropriate resolution would be “careful case management,
including strict control of discovery,” but not dismissal before the defendants
had even been required to deny the plaintiffs’ allegations of conspiracy to
restrain trade.81
II. FROM RULE 8 TO CONLEY V. GIBSON
In Bell Atlantic, the Court seems to have been won over by persistent, if
not terribly frequent, criticism of Conley v. Gibson’s “no set of facts” standard
in academic writings and lower court decisions.82  In his festschrift article hon-
oring the late Charles Alan Wright, which the Court cited in Bell Atlantic,83
Professor Hazard observed:
Prior to the line of lower court cases that culminated in Conley v. Gibson, it was
quite possible to interpret Rule 8’s requirement of a “short and plain” statement to
require, in essence, a detailed narrative in ordinary language—one setting forth all
elements of a claim under applicable substantive law.  That is, the key would have
been not that the complaint was to be above all “short,” but that it was to be above all
“plain” and showing entitlement to relief as a matter of law.84
The treatise he coauthored similarly states:
The ambiguity of the Federal Rules’ purpose has led to two lines of doctrine
about pleading. One line, which seems more consistent with the drafters’ intent, was
that the pleaders did have to allege, if only in sketchy terms, the existence of circum-
stances that they had reason to believe were true and that, if true, would entitle them
to relief of some kind.  The other line is that expressed by the Supreme Court in
Conley v. Gibson . . . .85
According to Professor Hazard, a party had to “‘[plead] himself out of
court’” to fail the Conley “no set of facts” standard.86  “Literal compliance
with Conley v. Gibson could consist simply of giving the names of the plaintiff
and the defendant, and asking for judgment.”87  Thus, “Conley v. Gibson
turned Rule 8 on its head . . . .”88  With its renewed insistence on enough
79 Id. at 1985.
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 1975.
82 See id. at 1969.
83 See id.
84 Hazard, supra note 53, at 1685 (emphasis added).
85 FLEMING JAMES, JR., GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & JOHN LEUBSDORF, CIVIL PROCEDURE
§ 3.6, at 190 (5th ed. 2001) [hereinafter JAMES, HAZARD & LEUBSDORF] (emphasis added)
(footnote omitted) (citing Decker v. Massey-Ferguson, Ltd., 681 F.2d 111, 114 (2d Cir.
1982); see also Hoshman v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 263 F.2d 499, 501 (5th Cir. 1959));
CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING § 19, at 146–48 (2d ed.
1947) [hereinafter CLARK, CODE PLEADING (2d ed.)].
86 Hazard, supra note 53, at 1685 (quoting Early v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 959 F.2d 75,
79 (7th Cir. 1992)).
87 Id.
88 Id.
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“[f]actual allegations . . . to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,”89
the Supreme Court appears to have agreed with that assessment of the “no set
of facts” standard.90
A. Rule 8(a)(2) and “Simplified Pleading”
The debate stirred in Bell Atlantic began in 1935, when the Supreme Court
appointed an Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure to draft “a
unified system of general rules for cases in equity and actions at law,”91 i.e., the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  On the Committee, nine lawyers joined five
law professors to form “an extremely elite group.”92  As noted, the “principal
draftsman”93 of the Rules was the Advisory Committee’s Reporter, Charles E.
Clark, Dean of the Yale Law School from 1929 to 1939 and Circuit Judge on
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit from 1939 until his
death in 1963.94
As every first-year procedure student now learns, the Advisory Committee
sought to replace the technicalities of common-law and code pleading in the
federal courts with a simpler, easier system of pleading in the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.95  As the United States entered the New Deal era, the federal
courts continued to maintain a dual system of law and equity.96 For cases in
equity, Congress had long given the Supreme Court rulemaking authority,97
and the courts were operating under the Federal Equity Rules adopted by the
Court in 1912.98  For actions at law, however, the Conformity Act99 required
89 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007).
90 See id. at 1969 (citing Hazard, supra note 53, at 1685).
91 Appointment Comm. to Draft Unified Sys. of Equity and Law Rules, 295 U.S. 774
(1935) (order appointing Advisory Committee).
92 Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law:  The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 971 n.369 (1987).  Among the
lawyers on the committee were the presidents of the American Law Institute and the Ameri-
can Bar Association, a former U.S. Solicitor General and Attorney General, a former federal
district judge, and a former justice of the Supreme Court of California. See id. at 971 &
n.369, 971–72 & nn.370 & 373; California Supreme Court Historical Society, History of the
California Courts:  The Justices, http://cschs.org/02_history/02_c.html (last visited Oct. 18,
2008) (Warren Olney, Jr.); Federal Judicial Center, History of the Federal Judiciary:  Judges
of the United States, http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/tGetInfo?jid=634 (last visited Oct. 18, 2008)
(George Donworth).  The professors were from Harvard, Yale, and the universities of Michi-
gan, Minnesota, and Virginia.  Subrin, supra, at 971 n.369.
93 Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 283 (1988).
94 Federal Judicial Center, History of the Federal Judiciary:  Judges of the United States,
supra note 92.  Clark was chief judge of the Second Circuit from 1954 to 1959. Id.
95 Justice Stevens provides a brief history in Part I of his dissent. Bell Atl. Corp., 127 S. Ct.
at 1975–77 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  For more detailed treatments, see JACK H.
FRIEDENTHAL, MARY KAY KANE & ARTHUR R. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE §§ 5.1, .7 (4th
ed. 2005) [hereinafter FRIEDENTHAL, KANE & MILLER] ; JAMES, HAZARD & LEUBSDORF,
supra note 85, § 3.6 at 187; 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1202 (3d ed. 2004) [hereinafter WRIGHT & MILLER].
96 See generally Charles E. Clark & James Wm. Moore, A New Civil Procedure:  I. The
Background, 44 YALE L.J. 387 (1935).
97 See 28 U.S.C. § 723 (1934) (amended 1948) (current version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2073
(2006)). See also Clark & Moore, supra note 96, at 391–92.
98
 Order Promulgating Rules of Practice for the Courts of Equity of the United States, 226
U.S. 629 (1912), amended by 268 U.S. 709 (1925) (amending Rules 10 & 30), also amended
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federal district courts to follow the procedure of the state in which the court
sat.100  At the time, half of the states and territories had adopted some form of
code pleading,101 leaving the other half with some version of common-law
pleading.  Thus, as late as the mid-1930s, “federal procedure was a strange
mixture”102 governed by the Federal Equity Rules for cases in equity, and
either common-law or code pleading for cases at law, depending on the state.
As Justice Stevens noted in his dissent,103 in the nineteenth century, com-
mon law pleading technicalities had gradually given way to reform as the
“Field Codes” sought to replace the common law writs and formulas with a
simpler requirement that the pleading state the “facts constituting the cause of
action.”104  Unfortunately, code pleading itself fell prey to complexity and
technicality as courts sought to distinguish “facts” from evidence on the one
hand and legal conclusions on the other, and to define what was meant by a
“cause of action.”105
The Advisory Committee sought to replace pleading technicalities with “a
very simple, concise system of allegation and defense.”106  This comported
with the Committee’s philosophy, espoused most prominently by Clark, “that
procedural rules are but means to an end, means to the enforcement of substan-
tive justice . . . .”107  According to Clark, “in effect, procedure should be the
hand-maid and not the mistress of justice.  And therefore rules of pleading or
practice should at all times be but an aid to an end and not an end in
themselves.”108
Thus, in framing a new pleading standard for the Federal Rules, the Advi-
sory Committee “studiously avoided using the terms ‘facts’ and ‘cause of
by 281 U.S. 773 (1930) (adding Rule 701/2), also amended by 286 U.S. 570 (1932) (amend-
ing Rule 75(b) and adding Rule 611/2). See also Wallace R. Lane, Twenty Years Under the
Federal Equity Rules, 46 HARV. L. REV. 638, 643–44 (1933).
99 Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. 196, 197 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 724 (1934))
(repealed 1948).
100 The Act had its limits, however. See Clark & Moore, supra note 96, at 406–07 (observ-
ing that, subject to the qualification that state procedure could not expand or limit federal
jurisdiction, “state practice, by virtue of the Conformity Act, governs the law [of] procedure
in federal courts from the commencement of an action up to and through judgment, provided
it is not violative of a constitutional right, and provided Congress has not legislated upon a
particular matter of practice”).  For examples of federal procedural statutes that limited the
Conformity Act, see id. at 409–11.
101 See Clark & Moore, supra note 96, at 393 & n.27 (citing CHARLES E. CLARK, HAND-
BOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING §8, at 19–22 (1928) [hereinafter CLARK, CODE
PLEADING (1st ed.)]).
102 JAMES, HAZARD & LEUBSDORF, supra note 85, § 1.8, at 23.
103 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1975-76 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
104 See generally FRIEDENTHAL, KANE & MILLER, supra note 95, § 5.1; JAMES, HAZARD &
LEUBSDORF, supra note 85, §§ 3.3–.5, at 184–87; 1 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S
FEDERAL PRACTICE § 1.02 (3d ed. 2008) [hereinafter MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE].
105 See generally FRIEDENTHAL, KANE & MILLER, supra note 95, §§ 5.4–.5; JAMES, HAZ-
ARD & LEUBSDORF, supra note 85, §§ 3.7–.8; 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 95, §§ 1202,
1218.
106 Charles E. Clark, Fundamental Changes Effected by the New Federal Rules I, 15 TENN.
L. REV. 551, 552 (1939).
107 Id. at 551.
108 Id. (footnote omitted) (citing In re Coles, (1907) 1 K.B. 1, 4 (opinion of Collins, M.R.);
Charles E. Clark, The Handmaid of Justice, 23 WASH. U. L.Q. 297 (1938)).
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action’” because those terms had “given so much trouble in Code Pleading.”109
Instead, the Committee’s new standard, ultimately located in Rule 8(a)(2),110
required a pleading seeking relief to contain “a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”111  Explaining the new
standard (then only in Preliminary Draft form) in a speech to the Judicial Con-
ference of the Fourth Circuit in June 1936, Clark observed that
[t]he old requirement that a party must plead only facts, avoiding evidence on the one
hand and law on the other, was logically indefensible, since the actual distinction is at
most one of degree only and in actual practice it caused more confusion than any
possible worth it might have as admonition.112
In a series of institutes and symposia sponsored by the American Bar
Association, Clark and the Advisory Committee educated the bench and bar on
the new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Clark explained that the new Rules
“do call for what we should fairly term rather general pleadings.”113  He
observed that “there is no question that the rules are based on the theory of a
rather general form of pleading” and that there was likewise “no question that
the rules can not be construed to require the detailed pleading that was the
theory, say, in England in 1830, or that, I think, is the theory in a few of the
states now.”114  Beyond that, however, Clark allowed that there would be
“some degree of difference of approach,” with some judges requiring more
detail and some less.115  Clark, in fact, admitted that his own views about
109 Armistead M. Dobie, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 25 VA. L. REV. 261, 263
n.9 (1939); see also Edson R. Sunderland, The New Federal Rules, 45 W. VA. L.Q. 5, 12
(1938).
110 The “short and plain” formula was located in Rule 14(2) of the Advisory Committee’s
Preliminary Draft published in May 1936, where it applied only to the complaint and
required “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the plaintiff is entitled to
relief.” ADVISORY COMM. ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 27 (May 1936) [hereinafter PRELIMINARY DRAFT]
(emphasis added).  In the Proposed Rules published in April 1937, the Committee moved
Rule 14(2) to Rule 8(a)(2), and made its provisions applicable to any “pleading which sets
forth a claim for relief;” consistent with this broader applicability, the “plaintiff” in the Pre-
liminary Draft of Rule 14(2) became the “pleader” in the Proposed Rule 8(a)(2). ADVISORY
COMM. ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE, PROPOSED RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE
DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES 22 (Apr. 1937).  Other than the substitution of
“pleader” for “plaintiff,” the final wording of Rule 8(a)(2) as adopted in 1937 was identical
to the Preliminary Draft’s Rule 14(2). Compare PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra, at 27 with 28
U.S.C. app. 105 (2006) (amended 2007).  For the wording of earlier drafts, see Stephen
Subrin, supra note 92, at 976.  The only change to original Rule 8(a)(2) made by the recent
“restyling” of the Federal Rules was typographical—replacing a comma with a semicolon.
Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2), 28 U.S.C. app. 105 (2006) with FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
111 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).  Of course, the pleading must also contain jurisdictional allega-
tions, if necessary, and a demand for relief. Id. at 8(a)(1), (3).
112 Charles E. Clark, The Proposed Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 22 A.B.A. J. 447, 450
(1936).
113 AM. BAR ASS’N, PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL RULES, CLEVELAND,
OHIO 220 (William W. Dawson ed., 1938) [hereinafter CLEVELAND INSTITUTE].
114 Id.  “England in 1830” is a reference to the infamous “Hilary rules,” which Clark cited
frequently as the epitome of hyper technical, and unjust, pleading standards. Id. at 221.
115 Id. at 220.
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pleading might “be considered rather extreme,” even to some of his fellow
Advisory Committee members.116
Clark rejected the common perception of common law pleading as always
being a hypertechnical form of special pleading aimed at producing “specific
narrow issues;” according to Clark, “the most general and most used actions
were pretty broad in their allegations.”117  Clark frequently used Form 9 to
show that the Federal Rules’ illustrative form for a pedestrian’s negligence
action against the driver of an automobile was copied from “the common law
form of the action of trespass on the case” for a horse and carriage collision
(via a form in use in Massachusetts).118  “In other words, these suggested forms
are the rather simple but well recognized historical forms of statement of vari-
ous claims.”119  Thus, Clark presented the Federal Rules and their forms as
preserving the best of common law pleading, while jettisoning the
technicalities.
As he would throughout his career, Clark discouraged wasting time, as he
put it, “trying to polish up the pleadings.”120  Clark observed that “our philoso-
phy is that it is not the function of the pleading to prove your case”121 nor was
it “the function of the pleadings to supply the place of evidence.”122  For Clark,
pleadings were meant to serve two purposes:  (1) “to distinguish the case from
all others so that you can properly send it through the processes of the court;”
and (2) “to serve as a basis for the binding force of the judgment, that is, for the
application of the principle of res adjudicata.”123  If the opposing attorney
needed more information, Clark consistently urged the use of discovery rather
than extended pleading practice.124
Clark did not deny the importance of stating the factual basis for relief
under the Rules, however.  Asked if the new Rules really meant to dispense
with pleading “ultimate facts” as required in Federal Equity Rule 25, Clark
responded “that the idea is still continued as an idea of worthwhile pleading,
but not as a strict rule for which you should be hung, drawn and crucified when
116 Id. Clark added:
[o]f course, I don’t think they are myself, but I am perfectly willing to give you that warning
. . . .
. . . .
So I will give you the warning that maybe I am going a little too far in what I say, but neverthe-
less I will go that way just the same, because I believe in it . . .
. . . .
[I]f you think I have gone too far you certainly can argue that to any district court.
Id. At 220-221.
117 Id.
118 Id. at 222–23 (citing 2 JOSEPH CHITTY, CHITTY’S TREATISE ON PLEADING AND PARTIES
TO ACTIONS 529 (7th ed. 1844); 2 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 147, Form 13 (1932)).
119 Id. at 227.
120 AM. BAR ASS’N, FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE:  PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE
AT WASHINGTON, D.C. AND OF THE SYMPOSIUM AT NEW YORK CITY 46 (1939) [hereinafter
“WASHINGTON INSTITUTE” or “NEW YORK SYMPOSIUM,” as applicable].
121 WASHINGTON INSTITUTE, supra note 120, at 40.
122 Id. at 41.
123 Id.
124 Id.
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you don’t follow it.”125  A judge would not be called upon, under the new
Federal Rules, to “formally decide that the pleading states only ultimate facts
and that everything else is erroneous,”126 but the idea of ultimate facts was
present “[i]n the sense that good pleading would call for you to state those more
general facts . . . .”127  In Washington, Clark observed that
you would have to have at least some allegations of fact. As a matter of fact, I think
that an allegation such as Form 9 is very definitely an allegation of fact. That Form 9
is the one of the pedestrian walking across the street. If you were to say, even under
these rules, “I am suing ‘X’ because he caused me injury by negligence,” I would say
that that is more general than is permitted by these rules. But if you say how he
injured you, in this case by carelessly driving his car into you, you have your factual
allegation.128
Advisory Committee member George Donworth, a prominent Seattle law-
yer and former federal district judge, similarly told the ABA symposium in
New York that the new Federal Rules would still require factual allegations in
pleadings.  Donworth observed that, in Rule 8(a), (b), and (e), “the word ‘facts’
does not appear in the designation of what a pleading must contain.”129  This,
according to Donworth, was because the term “facts” in the codes and Federal
Equity Rules promoted “motions to make definite, motions to strike, and so on.
It became a sort of narrowing expression.”130  He stressed, however, that
the requirement as to what a pleading shall contain does not by any means imply that
the facts are not to be stated.  In truth, the requirement includes facts—there must be
a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.
The statement naturally is to be a factual statement.131
So too with the use of the term “averment” “in Rule 8(e)(1), requiring
each averment of a pleading to be simple, concise and direct.”132  “The word
‘averment’ there implies a factual averment.”133
Both as a judge on the Second Circuit and in his academic writing, Clark
continued to advance his pleading philosophy.  In the famous case of
Dioguardi v. Durning,134 for example, Judge Judge Clark upheld a pro se com-
125 CLEVELAND INSTITUTE, supra note 113, at 230–31; see also H. Church Ford, J., Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure:  Pleadings, Motions, Parties and Pre-Trial Procedure, 1 F.R.D.
315, 315–16 (1940) (discussing Clark’s comments in Cleveland and Washington).
126 CLEVELAND INSTITUTE, supra note 113, at 231, quoted in Ford, supra note 125, at 316.
127 Id., quoted in Ford, supra note 125, at 316.
128 WASHINGTON INSTITUTE, supra 120 at 69.
129 NEW YORK SYMPOSIUM, supra note 120, at 307, quoted in Ford, supra note 125, at 316.
Judge Ford quoted Judge Donworth at length in his article on the Rules. Ford, supra note
125 at 316–17.  The 2007 revisions to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure redesignated
former Rule 8(e) as restyled Rule 8(d). See REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 220 (June 2, 2006, rev. July 20, 2006), reprinted in
H.R. DOC. NO. 110-27, at 638 (2007).
130 NEW YORK SYMPOSIUM, supra note 120, at 308, quoted in Ford, supra note 125, at 317.
131 Id., quoted in Ford, supra note 125, at 317 (emphasis added).
132 Id., quoted in Ford, supra note 125, at 317.
133 Id., quoted in Ford, supra note 125, at 317 (emphasis added). The 2007 revisions to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure substituted “allegation” for “averment” throughout the
Rules. See REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCE-
DURE, supra note 129, at 206, reprinted in H.R. DOC. NO. 110-27, at 624.
134 Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944).
\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\9-1\NVJ102.txt unknown Seq: 15  3-MAR-09 14:38
Fall 2008] A “PLAUSIBLE” SHOWING 15
plaint by a plaintiff with limited English skills against a Rule 12(b)(6) motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim.135  Judge Clark observed that, “[u]nder
the new rules of civil procedure, there is no pleading requirement of stating
‘facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action,’ but only that there be ‘a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.’”136  Clark concluded that “however inartistically they may be stated,
the plaintiff has disclosed his claims that the collector [of customs] has con-
verted or otherwise done away with two of his cases of medicinal tonics and
has sold the rest in a manner incompatible with” federal law.137  Critics seized
on the rejection of a pleading requirement of “facts sufficient to constitute a
cause of action” as virtually a rejection of requiring any factual allegations
whatsoever—an overreading of the case that Clark rejected.138  In a 1945 case,
Clark admonished that “the pleader should set forth a ‘simple statement in
sequence of the events which have transpired’ leaving to the court its ‘duty to
grant the relief to which the prevailing party is entitled.’”139
In the second edition of his Handbook on the Law of Code Pleading, pub-
lished in 1947, Judge Clark incorporated extensive discussions of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, which he considered an “advanced system[ ] of code
pleading.”140  As he had in the first edition of his treatise in 1928, Clark advo-
cated defining a “cause of action” in code jurisdictions as “an aggregate of
operative facts as will give rise to at least one right of action, but it is not
limited to a single right . . . . The extent of the cause is to be determined
pragmatically by the court . . . .”141  Noting that the Federal Rules “abandoned”
the term “cause of action” in favor of “claim for relief,” he observed that
“[n]evertheless, it is obvious that in result the rules do stress the factual ele-
ment in the claims and thus in substance support the approach to the general
problem”142 of defining a cause of action taken in his treatise.  “Hence the
federal system,” according to Clark, “with the states which follow it, affords
definite and well-understood support for the pragmatic factual cause” that he
advocated.143
Discussing “notice pleading” as used in some code pleading courts, Judge
Clark observed that “[u]nder this system the pleading, such as it is, simply
135 The plaintiff’s amended complaint is reprinted in JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL
PROCEDURE:  CASES AND MATERIALS 504 (9th ed. 2005).
136 Dioguardi, 139 F.2d at 775.
137 Id.
138 See ADVISORY COMM. ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE, REPORT OF PROPOSED AMEND-
MENTS TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS 19
(Oct. 1955) [hereinafter 1955 REPORT] (“The complaint in [Dioguardi v. Durning] stated a
plethora of facts and the court so construed them as to sustain the validity of the pleading.”),
reprinted in 12A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE app.
F, at 645 (2008) and 2 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 104, § 8App.01[3].
139 Charles E. Clark, J., Special Pleading in the “Big Case,” 21 F.R.D. 45, 52 (1957) (quot-
ing Gins v. Mauser Plumbing Supply Co., 148 F.2d 974, 976 (2d Cir. 1945)).
140 CLARK, CODE PLEADING (2d ed.), supra note 85, § 2, at 4; see also id. § 8, at 24–25
(“[T]he list [of code jurisdictions] was greatly expanded by the vast federal system of courts
upon the taking effect of the new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938.”).
141 Id. § 19, at 137.
142 Id. § 19, at 147 (emphasis added).
143 Id. § 19, at 147–48 (emphasis added).
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makes a very general reference to the happening out of which the case arose
and no attempt is made to state the details of the cause of action.”144  Although
that system had “worked well in certain courts,” such as municipal courts,145
Clark thought it “unlikely” to be adopted much more widely.  “The prevailing
idea at the present time is that notice should be given of all the operative facts
going to make up the plaintiff’s cause of action, except, of course, those which
are presumed or may properly come from the other side.”146  Thus, Judge Clark
continued to advocate a more moderate form of pleading that disclosed the
facts upon which a claim was based.
In the next paragraph, Judge Clark stated that “[t]he above analysis, as it
appeared in the first edition, now finds its most complete exemplification in the
Federal Rules.”147  This appears to be a reference, at least in part, to the moder-
ate “prevailing idea” of notice pleading as giving notice “of all the operative
facts going to make up the plaintiff’s cause of action” subject to certain excep-
tions—which was the final sentence of the “above analysis” in section 38 of the
first edition of Clark’s treatise.148  Later in the second edition of his treatise,
Clark referred to the Federal Rules’ discovery devices as “a necessary adjunct
to the simple form of ‘notice pleading’ advocated in this book.”149
Clark studiously refused to use the old code pleading terminology of
“facts” or “cause of action” when discussing pleading under the Rules, how-
ever.  He viewed the Federal Rules’ avoidance of those terms as one of their
most significant improvements over code pleading and essential to avoiding a
revival of old battles over those terms.150  Clark also generally avoided calling
pleading under the Federal Rules “notice pleading,” perhaps because that term
might suggest the more extreme form of notice pleading that he thought
unlikely to be widely adopted.151  He instead tended to call pleading under the
144 Id. § 38, at 240.
145 Id.
146 Id. (emphasis added).
147 Id. § 38, at 241.
148 See CLARK, CODE PLEADING (1st ed.), supra note 101, § 39, at 163.
149 CLARK, CODE PLEADING (2d ed.), supra note 85, § 89, at 571–72 (emphasis added).
150 See id. § 38, at 242 (“By omitting any reference to ‘facts’ the Federal Rules have
avoided one of the most controversial points in code pleading.”); id. § 38, at 225 (“This
avoids the former confusing emphasis upon pleading facts alone.”); id. § 19, at 146 (“The
term ‘cause of action’ is completely abandoned; and where a reference to rules for stating the
case is needed, the phrase employed is ‘claim for relief.’”).
151 Judge Clark would later tell the Wyoming Bar Association:
Some people love to say that all the rules require is fair notice, that pleading under the rules is
only notice pleading.  No member of the Advisory Committee, so far as I know, has ever said
that, and of course that isn’t the real theory.  Notice pleading is a beautiful nebulous thing . . . . I
don’t use that expression—not that I object to it as such.  I think it is something like the Golden
Rule, which is a nice hopeful thing; but I can’t find that it means much of anything and it isn’t
anything that we can use with any precision.
Charles E. Clark, Pleading Under the Federal Rules, 12 WYO. L.J. 177, 181 (1958). But see
CLARK, CODE PLEADING (2d ed.), supra note 85, § 89, at 572 (referring to “the simple form
of ‘notice pleading’ advocated in this book”).
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Federal Rules “general”152 or “simplified”153 pleading.  A decade later, Clark
would say “‘notice’ is not a concept of the Rules.”154
In his influential treatise, Professor James Wm. Moore, a colleague of
Clark’s at Yale Law School who served as Chief Research Assistant to the
Advisory Committee,155 and later as a member of the Advisory Committee,156
observed:
Perhaps it is not entirely accurate to say, as one court has said, that “it is only neces-
sary to state a claim in the pleadings . . . and not a cause of action.”  While the Rules
have substituted “claim” or “claim for relief” in lieu of the older and troublesome
term “cause of action,” the pleading still must state a “cause of action” in the sense
that it must show “that the pleader is entitled to relief.”  It is not enough to indicate
merely that the plaintiff has a grievance.  Sufficient detail must be given so that the
defendant, and the court, can obtain a fair idea of what the plaintiff is asserting, and
can see that there is some legal basis for recovery.157
Despite these suggestions that the Rules’ “claim” was not so entirely dif-
ferent from the codes’ “cause of action,” federal courts continued to hand down
decisions suggesting to critics that there was no requirement of stating a cause
of action of any kind.158  Critics charged that such interpretations read the
requirement of a “showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” out of Rule
8(a)(2).159
152 Charles E. Clark, Alabama’s Procedural Reform and the National Movement, 9 ALA. L.
REV. 167, 173 (1957).
153 CLARK, CODE PLEADING (2d ed.), supra note 85, at 241; see also Charles E. Clark,
Simplified Pleading, in THE JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION MONOGRAPHS:  SERIES A (COL-
LECTED) 100, 100 (1942) (referring to “a simple system of direct allegation, so successful a
feature of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure”), reprinted in Charles E. Clark, Simplified
Pleading, 2 F.R.D. 456, 456 (1943); Charles E. Clark, Simplified Pleading, 27 IOWA L. REV.
272, 272 (1942) (earlier draft of same monograph).
154 Clark, supra note 139, at 49.
155 1 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 104 § 1App.104 n.7.
156 Miscellaneous Orders, 345 U.S. 932, 932-33 (1953) (order appointing James William
Moore to Advisory Committee).
157 2A JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 8.13, at 8–66 to –67 (2d
ed. 1996) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Mortensen v. Chicago, Great W. Ry., 2 F.R.D. 121,
121 (S.D. Iowa 1941)). See also Hoshman v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 263 F.2d 499, 501 (5th
Cir. 1959) (quoting identical text in 2 JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE
1653 (2d ed. 1948)).  The Supreme Court quoted Professor Moore’s observation in Davis v.
Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 237–38 n.15 (1979).
158 See, e.g., Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Timetrust, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 34, 41 (N.D. Cal. 1939)
(“The modern philosophy concerning pleadings is that they do little more than indicate gen-
erally the type of litigation that is involved.  A generalized summary of the case that affords
fair notice is all that is required.”); Sunbeam Corp. v. Payless Drug Stores, 113 F. Supp. 31,
37 (N.D. Cal. 1953) (“[A]ll that Rule 8(a) requires of a complaint is that it indicate generally
the type of litigation that is involved; and a generalized summary of the case that affords fair
notice is sufficient.”); Porter v. Shoemaker, 6 F.R.D. 438, 440 (M.D. Pa. 1947) (same).  In
particular, Judge Clark’s opinion in Dioguardi “became a focal point of opposition to the
notice pleading of the Federal Rules.” FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 135, at 504-05.
159 Moses Lasky, Memorandum for the Committee on Rule 8, in JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF
THE JUDGES OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT, CLAIM OR CAUSE OF ACTION:  A DISCUSSION ON THE
NEED FOR AMENDMENT OF RULE 8(A)(2) OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE,
reprinted in 13 F.R.D. 253, 276 (1953) [hereinafter CLAIM OR CAUSE OF ACTION] (“Since
the books are now full of decisions reading out of that rule what is there, something may
well be added to assure that it is read correctly.”).
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B. “Guerilla Attacks” on Federal Pleading and the Advisory Committee’s
1955 Response
These minimalist interpretations of federal pleading led to “guerilla
attacks”160 on the line of “notice” pleading doctrine that culminated in Con-
ley’s “no set of facts” standard.  Critics charged that federal courts were “con-
struing ‘claim for relief’ as no more than a notice of disaffection on the part of
the plaintiff,”161 and had effectively “adopted a procedure so simple a 16-year-
old boy may draft pleadings.”162  In particular, the Judicial Conference of the
Ninth Circuit requested a complete return to code pleading with a resolution in
1952 asking that Rule 8(a)(2) be amended to require “a short and plain state-
ment of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, which statement
shall contain the facts constituting a cause of action.”163  The Judicial Confer-
ence sent the Ninth Circuit’s resolution to the Advisory Committee for
consideration.164
The Advisory Committee rejected the recommendation, proposing a new
note to Rule 8(a)(2).  The Committee noted that the attacks on Rule 8(a)(2)
“appeared[ed] to be based on the view that the rule does not require the aver-
ment of any information as to what has actually happened.”165  The Committee
responded “[t]hat Rule 8(a) envisages the statement of circumstances, occur-
rences, and events in support of the claim,” and that “[t]he intent and effect of
the rules is to permit the claim to be stated in general terms; the rules are
designed to discourage battles over mere form of statement and to sweep away
the needless controversies which the codes permitted that served either to delay
trial on the merits or to prevent a party from having a trial because of mistakes
in statement.”166  The Advisory Committee concluded that Rule 8 “requires the
160 RICHARD H. FIELD, BENJAMIN KAPLAN & KEVIN M. CLERMONT, MATERIALS FOR A
BASIC COURSE IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 1146 (9th ed. 2007).
161 CLAIM OR CAUSE OF ACTION, supra note 159, at 276.
162 O.L. McCaskill, The Modern Philosophy of Pleading:  A Dialogue Outside the Shades,
38 A.B.A. J. 123, 123 (1952), noted by Pierson M. Hall, J., June 13, 1952 Discussion, in
CLAIM OR CAUSE OF ACTION, supra note 159, at 264-65.
163 CLAIM OR CAUSE OF ACTION, supra note 159, at 253 (emphasis added).  In addition, as
Professor Marcus has noted, “some district judges in New York undertook to upgrade plead-
ing requirements in antitrust cases,” and “Professor McCaskill lobbied academically for a
return to the old ways.”  Richard L. Marcus, The Puzzling Persistence of Pleading Practice,
76 TEX. L. REV. 1749, 1750 n.5 (1998) (citing Archie O. Dawson, The Place of the Plead-
ings in a Proper Definition of the Issues in the “Big Case,” in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEMI-
NAR ON PROTRACTED CASES, reprinted in 23 F.R.D. 430, 433–35 (1958); McCaskill, supra
note 162).
164 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 95, § 1216, at 239 (citing REPORTS OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 23 (1952)).
165 1955 REPORT, supra note 138, at 18, reprinted in 12A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note
95, app. F, at 644 and 2 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 104, § 8App.01[3].  A
proposed note to Rule 8 taken from 1955 REPORT, supra, is reprinted in 2 MOORE’S FEDERAL
PRACTICE, supra note 104, 634-35 (2008).
166 1955 REPORT, supra note 138, at 18–19, reprinted in 12A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET
AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE app. F, at 645 (2008) and 2 MOORE’S FEDERAL
PRACTICE, supra note 104, § 8App.01[3].
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pleader to disclose adequate information as the basis of his claim for relief as
distinguished from a bare averment that he wants relief and is entitled to it.”167
In 1957, Judge Clark stressed that mere “‘notice’ is not a concept of the
Rules, as the Advisory Committee’s Note . . . so carefully points out.”168  He
was even more emphatic, however, “that strict special pleading has never been
found workable or even useful in English and American law. . . . General fact
pleading is useful; special pleading of details, carried to the extreme, . . . has
shown all the evils apparent . . . in the Hilary Rules.”169  But he went on to say
that the “assumed dichotomy” between “‘stat[ing] a cause of action instead of
merely stating a claim,’” was contrary to the principles of the Rules expressed
in the Advisory Committee’s 1955 note, and “without any specific content of
meaning.”170
Judge Clark thus continued to reject a too-sharp distinction between the
codes’ “cause of action” and Rule 8’s “claim.”171  As he put it in 1958, “[w]ith
the need for clarity without technicality in mind, the Advisory Committee by
precept and illustration established a system of general pleading not at all a
departure from the best common-law precedents, and not the ‘notice’ pleading
often advocated by many whose aims are high, but whose ideas are unclear.”172
Around the same time, he told the Wyoming bar that the Advisory Committee’s
167 Id. at 19, reprinted in 12A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE app. F, at 645 (2008) and 2 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 104,
§ 8App.01[3].
168 Clark, supra note 139, at 49–50.  Judge Clark attached the Advisory Committee’s Note
on Rule 8(a)(2) as an appendix to his paper. See id. at 53–54.
169 Id. at 47.  The “Hilary Rules” were “[a] collection of English pleading rules” adopted in
1834 that “extend[ed] the reach of strict-pleading requirements into new areas of law.  Wide-
spread dissatisfaction with the Hilary Rules led to the liberalization of the pleading system
under the 1873–1875 Judicature Acts.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 747 (8th ed. 2004).
According to Holdsworth, “never was a more disastrous mistake made.  ‘Under the common
law system the matter was bad enough with a pleading question decided in every sixth case.
But under the Hilary Rules it was worse.  Every fourth case decided a question on the plead-
ings.  Pleading ran riot.’”  9 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 325 (3d
ed. 1944) (quoting Clark B. Whittier, Notice Pleading, 31 HARV. L. REV. 501, 507 (1918)).
The Hilary Rules were a favorite foil for Clark when discussing pleading reform. See, e.g.,
Clark, supra note 74, at 976 (observing that, under the Hilary Rules, “never has pleading
been more technical and abstruse or justice more often denied for errors of form”); Clark,
Simplified Pleading, supra note 153, at 276, reprinted in 2 F.R.D. at 459 (describing the
Hilary Rules as “a famous example of the evils of special pleading”); Clark, supra note 139,
at 45–46.
170 Clark, supra note 139, at 50 (quoting United Grocers’ Co. v. Sau-Sea Foods, Inc., 150 F.
Supp. 267, 269 (S.D.N.Y 1957)).  According to Judge Clark, “The dichotomy is more one
between ‘general’ and ‘special’ pleading, with renewed emphasis on the former, than
between the old and the new.”  Clark, Pleading Under the Federal Rules, supra note 151, at
173.
171 One commentator has suggested that Clark’s “sterner tone” with respect to pleading
requirements in the 1950s “may have signified a tactical shift rather than a change of heart.”
Michael E. Smith, Judge Charles E. Clark and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 85
YALE L.J. 914, 925 (1976).  Noting the assaults on simplified pleading in the 1950s, Smith
suggests “Clark may have decided to fend off these challenges by deemphasizing the liberal-
ity of existing law.” Id. at 926.
172 Charles E. Clark, Two Decades of the Federal Civil Rules, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 435, 449
(1958).  The reference to “precept” is to the Rules themselves, particularly Rule 8.  The
reference to “illustration” means the forms included in the Appendix to the Rules, which
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1955 report “was our final definite statement. It’s not notice pleading.  It’s
more than that.  It’s a general statement of the case, but it is not detailed plead-
ing either.”173  Thus, in fending off attacks on Rule 8(a)(2), Judge Clark and
the Advisory Committee responded by explaining that the Rules represented a
middle course between the technicality that had come to characterize code
pleading (especially in New York), on one side, and the laxity of pure “notice”
pleading, on the other.
The 1953 district court decision in Daves v. Hawaiian Dredging Co.174
took such a middle-of-the-road approach. Daves was a sprawling action on
behalf of more than 4,600 employees against eight defense contractors engaged
in construction projects for Naval Air Bases in Hawaii and various United
States possessions throughout the Pacific.175  The complaint alleged that the
defendants had failed to pay the plaintiffs overtime compensation in violation
of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA).176
Defendants, represented by then-Assistant Attorney General Warren E.
Burger, moved to dismiss and asserted, among other things, that the plaintiffs’
complaint did not satisfy Rule 8.177  Defendants rhetorically asked
[W]hether the overall spirit of the Federal Rules and the specific requirements of
Rule 8 are met by a complaint which avoids material details, uses generalized state-
ments of fact and law designed to blanket in everyone, and dumps 4646 plaintiffs
into a single shot-gun complaint casting the burden of preparation and disclosure on
the defendants in the hope that some shot will bring down some quarry, or that the
action will become so involved as to lead to a settlement to get rid of it.178
The district court responded that it did not.179  In language later quoted by
Wright & Miller, the district court observed:
[I]t seems to be the purpose of Rule 8 to relieve the pleader from the niceties of the
dotted i and the crossed t and the uncertainties of distinguishing in advance between
evidentiary and ultimate facts, while still requiring, in a practical and sensible way,
that he set out sufficient factual matter to outline the elements of his cause of action
or claim, proof of which is essential to his recovery.180
In short, according to the Daves court, Rule 8(a)(2)’s “claim” was like the
old “cause of action,” but without the old technicalities.  A general factual
statement identifying some legal entitlement to relief would suffice.
Judge Clark maintained were essential to a proper understanding of what the pleading rules
aimed to do.
173 Clark, Pleading Under the Federal Rules, supra note 151, at 187 (emphasis added).
174 Daves v. Hawaiian Dredging Co., 114 F. Supp. 643 (D. Haw. 1953).
175 Id. at 646-47.
176 Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–19 (1952).
177 Daves, 114 F. Supp. at 645.
178 Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment
at 17, Daves v. Hawaiian Dredging Co., 114 F. Supp. 643 (D. Haw. 1953) (Civ. Action No.
674), available at Case Files, United States District Court for the District of Hawaii, Records
of District Courts of the United States, Record Group 21, National Archives and Records
Administration—Pacific Region (San Francisco) (also on file with the author).
179 Daves, 114 F. Supp. at 646.
180 Id. at 645 (emphasis added), quoted in 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 95, § 1216, at
233.  The excerpt has appeared in Wright & Miller since the first edition in 1969. See 5
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 1216, at 123–24 (1st ed. 1969).
\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\9-1\NVJ102.txt unknown Seq: 21  3-MAR-09 14:38
Fall 2008] A “PLAUSIBLE” SHOWING 21
C. Conley v. Gibson and “No Set of Facts”
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court never acted on the Advisory Commit-
tee’s 1955 Report, and dissolved the Committee the following year.181  Some
of the language in Conley v. Gibson appeared to endorse the Advisory Commit-
tee’s approach, however, for the opinion noted not only the Rules’ requirement
of “fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is” but also “the grounds upon
which it rests.”182 Conley’s “no set of facts” language, on the other hand,
appeared to be a repudiation of factual pleading, even general fact pleading,
altogether. Conley’s “no set of facts” language, at least if read literally, repre-
sented an endorsement of “notice” pleading in its least demanding form.  Only
where the plaintiff “plead[ed] himself out of court” could a complaint be
dismissed.183
Some commentators concluded that the “Court could not have meant liter-
ally what it said,” and suggested that the “no set of facts” language was “hyper-
bole.”184  Hyperbole or not, the “decision was apparently intended to put the
matter of deciding cases on the pleadings to rest, and proposals to tighten the
pleading rules ceased.”185  More importantly, the “no set of facts” language
became the pleading standard in thousands of cases for the next fifty years.
III. THE ROAD NOW TAKEN?
By sweeping away Conley’s “no set of facts” standard, Bell Atlantic opens
the way for the more moderate interpretation of Rule 8(a)(2) suggested by
Professors Wright, Miller, Moore, and Hazard and utilized in cases such as
Daves.  The road not taken in Conley may be the road now taken a half century
later.  Moreover, Bell Atlantic itself suggests how the new standard can be for-
mulated for future cases.
181 See Order Discharging the Advisory Comm., 352 U.S. 803 (1956); 4 WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra note 95, § 1006, at 37 (3d ed. 2002).  In 1958, Congress authorized the Judi-
cial Conference of the United States to “carry on a continuous study of” and make recom-
mendations for improvements to the rules of practice and procedure used in the federal
courts.  Act of July 11, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-513, 72 Stat. 356 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 331
(2000)).  To implement the Act, the Judicial Conference created the current standing Com-
mittee on Rules of Practice and Procedure with advisory committees reporting to it, includ-
ing the Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, 6–7 (1959), http://
www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/1958-09-ST-JC_approves_ST_Comm_Adv_Comm.pdf.
182 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957) (emphasis added).  For a detailed account of
the Conley v. Gibson litigation, see Emily Sherwin, The Story of Conley:  Precedent by
Accident, in CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES 281 (Kevin M. Clermont ed. 2004).  As Sherwin
notes, although “Justice Black’s remarks in Conley have been treated as a definitive resolu-
tion of the long debate over pleading, . . . there is no evidence that the Court considered the
fine points of that debate.” Id. at 305.  Indeed, Moses Lasky complained in 1961 that he had
“consulted the briefs in Conley v. Gibson to see how much of the literature on the subject,
how much of the pros and cons, had been brought before the court.  They contained—noth-
ing, not a syllable.”  Moses Lasky, Observing Appellate Opinions from Below the Bench, 49
CAL. L. REV. 831, 836 (1961).  For Justice Black’s response, see id.
183 Hazard, supra note 53, at 1685 (quoting Early v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 959 F.2d 75,
79 (7th Cir. 1992)).
184 JAMES, HAZARD & LEUBSDORF, supra note 85, at 190.
185 Marcus, supra note 163, at 1750. R
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Professor Hazard’s suggestion that Rule 8(a)(2), properly interpreted,
requires a factual “narrative in ordinary language . . . setting forth all elements
of a claim under applicable substantive law”186 is similar to the Car Carriers
requirement—quoted in Bell Atlantic—of “direct or inferential allegations
respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain a recovery under some
viable legal theory.”187  It also echoes Judge Clark’s formulation of a moderate
form of notice pleading for code jurisdictions.188
The precise formulation of the Rule 8 standard utilized in Car Carriers
originated in the Former Fifth Circuit’s 1981 decision in In re Plywood Anti-
trust Litigation.189  There, the Fifth Circuit observed:
Despite the liberality of modern rules of pleading, a complaint still must contain
either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary
to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory. . . . “[I]f a pleader cannot allege
definitely and in good faith the existence of an essential element of his claim, it is
difficult to see why this basic deficiency should not be exposed at the point of mini-
mum expenditure of time and money by the parties and the court.”190
On the former point, the Fifth Circuit cited a district court decision, which
in turn quoted a similar statement in the first edition of Wright & Miller;191
thus, the Plywood Antitrust formulation is really just a paraphrase of Wright &
Miller.  On the latter point, the Fifth Circuit was quoting Daves v. Hawaiian
Dredging Co.,192 the case quoted at length in the same section of Wright &
Miller; the same excerpt, along with a citation to Daves, also appears in Bell
Atlantic.193
These authorities suggest an appropriate interpretation of the Rule 8(a)(2)
pleading standard after Bell Atlantic:  factual allegations in plain language
touching (either directly or by inference) all material elements necessary to
recover under substantive law—but freed from the technicalities of common
186 Hazard, supra note 53, at 1685.  I omit Professor Hazard’s use of the adjective
“detailed” in reference to the factual narrative because it could be understood to suggest a
greater level of detail than the Car Carriers line of cases requires.
187 Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (1984) (quoting Sutliff, Inc.
v. Donovan Cos., 727 F.2d at 654, in turn quoting In Re Plywood Antitrust, 655 F.2d 627,
641 (5th Cir. Unit A Sept. 1981)).
188 See CLARK, CODE PLEADING (2d ed.), supra note 85, § 38, at 240.
189 Plywood Antitrust, 655 F.2d at 627.
190 Id. at 641-42 (citations omitted) (quoting Daves v. Hawaiian Dredging Co., 114 F. Supp.
643, 645 (D. Haw. 1953)).
191 Id. (citing City of Gainsville v. Florida Power & Light Co., 488 F. Supp. 1258, 1263
(S.D. Fla. 1980), in turn quoting 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 180, at 121–23 (1st ed. R
1969)).
192 Daves v. Hawaiian Dredging Co., 114 F. Supp. 643, 645 (D. Haw. 1953).  Although the
Former Fifth Circuit attributed its quotation from Daves to the late Chief Justice Burger,
Plywood Antitrust, 655 F.2d at 642, the excerpt is from the district court’s opinion.  Daves,
114 F. Supp. at 645.  The district court’s opinion does not indicate that it is quoting (or
paraphrasing) the defendants’ argument; there is no citation of any kind for this statement.
See id.  A review of the Daves case file shows the defendants argued at some length that the
plaintiffs had not satisfied Rule 8, but their argument contains no statements from which the
excerpt appears to have been taken. See Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss or for Summary Judgment, supra note 178, at 16–19.
193 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1966 (2007) (quoting 5 WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra note 95, §1216, at 233–34 , in turn quoting Daves, 114 F. Supp. at 645).
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law and code pleading.  One of the benefits of the Plywood Antitrust/Car Car-
riers formulation of the standard is that it directs attention to “allegations” on
“the material elements necessary to sustain recovery” without reference to
either the “facts” or the “cause of action” that so plagued code pleading.
A major reason for rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s plea to add code pleading
language to Rule 8(a)(2) was the fear that such language would revive battles
over what constituted “facts” and the proper definition of a “cause of
action.”194  By avoiding the language of the codes, the Plywood Antitrust/Car
Carriers formulation encourages courts to focus on the Rules’ textual standard
of “entitle[ment] to relief,” as measured by the elements necessary to recover,
without returning to the technicalities of code pleading.
Moreover, measuring “entitle[ment] to relief” by “the material elements
necessary to sustain recovery” finds support in the history of Rule 8.  In
upholding a government antitrust complaint in United States v. Employing
Plasterers Association,195 the Supreme Court noted that, “where a bona fide
complaint is filed that charges every element necessary to recover, summary
dismissal of a civil case for failure to set out evidential facts can seldom be
justified.”196  Judge Clark later quoted this language from Employing Plaster-
ers in his paper, Special Pleading in the “Big Case”?197
The Supreme Court’s decision in Swierkiewicz does not reject, as some
have suggested,198 requiring a complaint to allege the elements of a claim
under substantive law. Swierkiewicz rejected using an evidentiary standard as a
pleading standard; it did not reject measuring the sufficiency of a complaint by
whether it alleged all of the elements necessary to recover.199  For example,
one of the plaintiff’s claims in Swierkiewicz was a Title VII claim for national
origin discrimination.200  There are two elements of a statutory claim for
national origin discrimination:  (1) an adverse employment action (e.g., firing,
demoting, refusing to hire); and (2) the plaintiff’s national origin was a “moti-
194 See 1955 REPORT, supra note 138, at 19, reprinted in 12A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra
note 95, app. F, at 644 and 2 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 104, § 8App.01[3].
195 United States v. Employing Plasterers Ass’n, 347 U.S. 186 (1954).
196 Id. at 189 (emphasis added).
197 Clark, supra note 139, at 49.
198 See MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 104, at § 8.04[1a] (“The Supreme Court
. . . has rejected the idea that courts should measure a pleading’s adequacy by the elements of
a claim.”).  The third edition of Moore’s Federal Practice was first published in 1997, after
Professor Moore’s death in 1994.  Wolfgang Saxon, Obituary, James W. Moore, 89, Legal
Scholar and Teacher, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1994, at B8.
199 See John P. Lenich, Notice Pleading Comes to Nebraska:  Part I – Pleading Claims for
Relief, NEB. LAW., Sept. 2002, at 2, 7 n.12 (“The authors [of Moore’s Federal Practice] are
wrong.”).
200 Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 509 (2001). Section 703(a)(1) of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1) (2000).
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vating factor” in the employer’s decision.201  Swierkiewicz had plainly alleged
both of those elements in his complaint.202
The Second Circuit’s “heightened pleading” standard required more than
the two statutory elements of national origin discrimination, however.  It
required allegations of all four elements of a McDonnell Douglas203 prima
facie case:  “(1) membership in a protected group; (2) qualification for the job
in question; (3) an adverse employment action; and (4) circumstances that sup-
port an inference of discrimination.”204  The Supreme Court rejected making
McDonnell Douglas’s “evidentiary standard” into a “pleading requirement.”205
In particular, the Court observed that
[I]t is not appropriate to require a plaintiff to plead facts establishing a prima facie
case because the McDonnell Douglas framework does not apply in every employ-
ment discrimination case.  For instance, if a plaintiff is able to produce direct evi-
dence of discrimination, he may prevail without proving all the elements of a prima
facie case. . . . It . . . seems incongruous to require a plaintiff, in order to survive a
motion to dismiss, to plead more facts than he may ultimately need to prove to suc-
ceed on the merits if direct evidence of discrimination is discovered.206
What the Court rejected in Swierkiewicz was requiring a complaint to
allege all the elements of the McDonnell Douglas evidentiary standard; the
Court did not reject requiring a plaintiff to allege all the elements of a statutory
claim. Swierkiewicz does not suggest that the plaintiff’s complaint would have
been sufficient if it had failed to allege an adverse employment action or plain-
tiff’s national origin as a motivating factor for that action (the required statutory
elements).  Thus, Swierkiewicz does not reject requiring a complaint to allege
all the elements of a claim under substantive law.
In fact, Bell Atlantic itself is an exercise in measuring “entitle[ment] to
relief”207 by “the material elements necessary to sustain a recovery.”208  The
first element of an offense under section 1 of the Sherman Act is “that the
defendants entered into an agreement or conspiracy.”209  The Court held in Bell
201 See id.  Model jury instructions confirm this:
To prove his [her] claim, plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence:
First, that defendant [e.g., failed to hire, promote, or demoted] the plaintiff, and
Second, that plaintiff’s [e.g., race, gender, religion] was a motivating factor in defendant’s
decision.
5 LEONARD B. SAND ET AL., MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 88-133 (2007).
202 Among other things, Swierkiewicz alleged:
20. Mr. Chavel demoted Mr. Swierkiewicz on account of his national origin (Hungarian) and his
age (he was 49 at the time).
. . . .
37. Plaintiff’s age and national origin were motivating factors in SOREMA’s decision to termi-
nate his employment.
Amended Complaint, Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 86 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1595
(S.D.N.Y 2000) (No. 99 Civ. 12272), reprinted in Joint Appendix at 25a, 27a., Swierkiewicz
v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2001) (No. 00-1853), 2001 WL 34093952.
203 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
204 Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510 (2001)
205 Id. at 510–11.
206 Id. at 511-12.
207 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
208 In re Plywood Antitrust, 655 F.2d 627, 641 (5th Cir. Unit A Sept. 1981).
209 See 4 SAND ET AL., supra note 201, at 79-98.
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Atlantic that plaintiffs had failed to allege sufficient facts to suggest that such
an agreement or conspiracy was “plausible.”210  Accordingly, the plaintiffs had
failed to establish that they were “entitled to relief” under Rule 8(a)(2) because
they failed to allege sufficiently one of “the material elements necessary to
sustain recovery” under section 1 of the Sherman Act.211
The Plywood Antitrust/Car Carriers interpretation of Rule 8(a)(2) remains
a break from the technical horrors that often accompanied code pleading, and
continues to permit the Rule to be construed liberally to avoid dismissals for
“foot faults” in pleading.  True, it represents a somewhat higher standard than
the literal terms of Conley’s “no set of facts” language permitted.  As Professor
Hazard’s article suggests, however, this interpretation is “quite possible” again
now that Rule 8 is no longer “turned . . . on its head” by Conley v. Gibson.212
IV. NOT THAT NEW—AND NOT THAT HIGH—AFTER ALL:  THE
IMPORTANCE OF INFERENCE
This “new” standard will not really be new in many circuits.  As noted, the
Seventh Circuit’s Car Carriers formulation of the Rule 8(a)(2) standard was
first articulated by the Fifth Circuit in Plywood Antitrust, but Wright & Miller
has said essentially the same thing since 1969.213  The Plywood Antitrust/Car
Carriers standard has been used not only in the Fifth and Seventh Circuits, but
in the First,214 Sixth,215 Eleventh,216 and District of Columbia217 Circuits as
well. After Bell Atlantic, the Third,218 Eighth,219 and Tenth220 Circuits have
used the standard too, albeit frequently in unpublished decisions.
210 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1971 (2007) (“We think that nothing
contained in the complaint invests either the action or inaction alleged with a plausible sug-
gestion of conspiracy.”).
211 See id. at 1973 n.14 (“[T]he complaint warranted dismissal because it failed in toto to
render plaintiffs’ entitlement to relief plausible.”).
212 Hazard, supra note 53, at 1685.
213 See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
214 Fitzgerald v. Codex Corp., 882 F.2d 586, 589 (1st Cir. 1989).
215 Scheid v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 436 (6th Cir. 1988) (quoting
Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101 (1984), in turn citing In re Plywood
Antitrust, 655 F.2d 627 (5th Cir. Unit A Sept. 1981)).  The Sixth Circuit has begun citing
Bell Atlantic for its use of the Car Carriers standard.  League of United Latin Am. Citizens
v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523, 527 (6th Cir. 2007).
216 Roe v. Aware Woman Ctr. for Choice, Inc., 253 F.3d 678, 683 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting
Plywood Antitrust, 655 F.2d 627). In Bonner v. City of Prichard, the Eleventh Circuit
adopted as binding precedent all decisions handed down by the Former Fifth Circuit before
the close of business on September 30, 1981.  Bonner v. City of Prichard, Ala., 661 F.2d
1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).  Thus, Plywood Antitrust is binding precedent in the
Eleventh Circuit.
217 District of Columbia v. Air Fla., Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1081 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
218 See Montville Township v. Woodmont Builders, LLC, 244 F. App’x 514, 517 (3d Cir.
2007); Haspel v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 241 F. App’x 837, 839 (3d Cir. 2007).
219 See Carter v. Hassell, No. 07-1145, 2008 WL 649180, at *1 (8th Cir. 2008); Abdullah v.
Minnesota, 261 F. App’x 926, 927 (8th Cir. 2008).
220 Bryson v. Gonzales, 534 F.3d 1282, 1286 (10th Cir. 2008).
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A. Liberal Construction of the Plywood Antitrust/Car Carriers Standard
and the Importance of “Inferential Allegations”
Subsequent decisions applying the Plywood Antitrust/Car Carriers stan-
dard, moreover, suggest that the standard should be liberally construed.  For
example, in Roe v. Aware Woman Center for Choice,221 the Eleventh Circuit
emphasized the continued liberality of Rule 8(a)(2) under the Plywood Anti-
trust/Car Carriers standard.222  As the Eleventh Circuit observed in 1986, even
under the Plywood Antitrust/Car Carriers standard, “the liberal ‘notice plead-
ing’ standards embodied in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) do not
require that a plaintiff specifically plead every element of a cause of action.”223
The court quoted a leading treatise on civil procedure for the proposition that
“the pleader need not . . . worry about the particular form of the statement or
that it fails to allege a specific fact to cover every element of the substantive
law involved.”224  It quoted Wright & Miller to the same effect:  “[T]he com-
plaint . . . need not state with precision all of the elements that are necessary to
give rise to a legal basis for recovery as long as fair notice of the nature of the
action is provided to the opposing party.”225  On the other hand,
[W]hile notice pleading may not require that the pleader allege a ‘specific fact’ to
cover every element or allege “with precision” each element of a claim, it is still
necessary that a complaint “contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting
all the material elements necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal
theory.”226
To resolve the tension between the Plywood Antitrust/Car Carriers
requirement of “all the material elements necessary to sustain a recovery,” with
these other authorities’ emphasis that notice pleading did not require this to be
done “with precision” or with a “specific fact” for each element, the Eleventh
Circuit emphasized the “inferential” aspect of the standard.227  As the Eleventh
Circuit put it, “at a minimum, notice pleading requires that a complaint contain
inferential allegations from which we can identify each of the material elements
necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory.”228  This com-
ports with Wright & Miller, which states that “the pleading must contain alle-
gations from which an inference fairly may be drawn by the district court that
evidence on these material points will be available and introduced at trial,”229
221 Roe, 253 F.3d 678.
222 Id. at 684.
223 Id. at 683.
224 Id. (quoting JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE §5.7 (2d ed. 1993) (empha-
sis added)). See also FRIEDENTHAL, KANE & MILLER, supra note 95, at 268 (citing Roe, 253
F.3d at 683).
225 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 95, § 1216, at 214–20 (emphasis added), quoted in Roe,
253 F.3d at 683 (without alteration or emphasis).
226 Roe, 253 F.3d at 683 (quoting In re Plywood Antitrust, 655 F.2d 627, 641 (5th Cir. Unit
A Sept. 1981)) (emphasis omitted in Roe).
227 Id. at 684.
228 Id. (emphasis added).
229 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 95, § 1216, at 227.  This is the language paraphrased in
Plywood Antitrust. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
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adding that the viable legal theory need “not be the one suggested or intended
by the pleader.”230
B. Form 9 and “Inferential Allegations”
The importance of “inferential allegations” under Plywood Antitrust and
Car Carriers is underscored by the Supreme Court’s continued reliance on the
Form 9 “Complaint for Negligence” in the Appendix of Forms to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.231  Rule 84 provides that “[t]he forms in the Appen-
dix suffice under these rules and illustrate the simplicity and brevity that these
rules contemplate.”232  Both the Court and the dissenters pointed to Form 9 in
Bell Atlantic, emphasizing its sufficiency under Rule 8(a)(2).233  This suffi-
ciency is not immediately apparent, however, if “entitle[ment] to relief” under
the Rule is measured by reference to “all the material elements necessary to
sustain a recovery,” as Plywood Antitrust and Car Carriers hold.234
As others have noted, Form 9 “does not specifically allege all the elements
of the tort of negligence (e.g., duty, breach, causation, and injury).  It does not
even allege what the defendant did that was negligent.  Was he speeding, intox-
icated, or driving against a red light?”235  If Form 9 does not allege all the
elements of negligence, and Form 9 is a model complaint specifically made
“sufficient” by the Rules, how can it be correct to measure entitlement by the
material elements necessary to recover?  The answer lies in the “inferential
allegations” that satisfy the Plywood Antitrust/Car Carriers standard.
Judge Clark repeatedly used Form 9 to illustrate the operation of Rule
8(a)(2).  As he told the Wyoming Bar Association in 1958, Form 9 “particular-
izes the accident from among all other accidents in the world and gives you the
basic picture.  If you can’t fill it in, you’re not living in this world.”236  As he
put it some years earlier,
there are only certain kinds and numbers of misdeeds—speed, signals, position on
the highway, failure to look, and so on—which either party can commit.  These each
party should prepare himself to face; even if they be unstated, a wise counsel will not
face trial without considering their contingency.”237
In other words, Form 9 gives sufficient information for the court and the
defendant to draw reasonable inferences about the kind of negligent conduct
230 WRIGHT &MILLER, supra note 95, § 1216 at 227, paraphrased in St. Joseph’s Hosp.,
Inc. v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 795 F.2d 948, 954 (11th Cir. 1986), in turn quoted in part in
Roe, 253 F.3d at 683.
231 Form 9, Complaint for Negligence, FED. R. CIV. P., 28 U.S.C. app. 285 (2006) (amended
2007).  In the 2007 revisions to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Form 9 was updated
and redesignated as Form 11.
232 FED. R. CIV. P. 84.
233 See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1971 n.10 (2007); id. at 1977 (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting).
234 See In re Plywood Antitrust, 655 F.2d 627, 641 (5th Cir. Unit A Sept. 1981); Car Carri-
ers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1106 (1984) (quoting Sutliff, Inc. v. Donovan Cos.,
727 F.2d 648, 654 (7th Cir. 1984), in turn quoting Plywood Antitrust, 655 F.2d at 641).
235 MICHAEL ALLEN & MICHAEL FINCH, AN ILLUSTRATED GUIDE TO CIVIL PROCEDURE 36
(2006).
236 Clark, Pleading Under the Federal Rules, supra note 151, at 182 (emphasis added).
237 Clark, Simplified Pleading, supra note 153, at 106, reprinted in 2 F.R.D. 456, 462.
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plaintiff will attempt to prove.  Moreover, as Clark also repeatedly noted, if the
defendant wants more specifics, the discovery rules238 provide an easy and
quick way to obtain them.
Under the Plywood Antitrust/Car Carriers standard, the pleader need not
support its claim with a “specific fact” for each element or identify each ele-
ment of its claim “with precision,” but there must be enough alleged for the
court reasonably to infer allegations on the material elements necessary to
recover under a viable legal theory.  Moreover, the pleader does not have to
choose a particular legal theory, and may even have in mind the wrong legal
theory — as long as the court can discern “some viable legal theory” that
would entitle the pleader to relief.
C. Erickson v. Pardus
The continued liberality of pleading under Rule 8(a)(2) after Bell Atlantic
is suggested by the Supreme Court’s per curiam decision in Erickson v.
Pardus.239  Decided only two weeks after Bell Atlantic, the Court vacated a
Tenth Circuit decision dismissing a prisoner’s pro se complaint alleging prison
officials’ deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in violation of the
Eighth Amendment.240  The prisoner alleged that he suffered from hepatitis C,
that he had begun treatment for the disease, but that prison officials had
removed him from treatment “in violation of department protocol, ‘thus endan-
gering [his] life.’”241  The district court found Erickson’s allegations of “sub-
stantial harm” insufficient, and the Tenth Circuit affirmed.242
The Court quoted Rule 8(a)(2)’s “short and plain statement” requirement,
and observed that “[s]pecific facts are not necessary.”243  Quoting Bell Atlantic
and Conley, the Court stated that “the statement need only ‘ “give the defendant
fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,” ’ ”244
and noted that the judge must accept all of the complaint’s factual allegations
as true when ruling on a motion to dismiss, again citing Bell Atlantic.245  The
Court noted that the prisoner’s complaint alleged that the prison officials’ deci-
sion to remove him “from his prescribed hepatitis C medication was ‘endanger-
ing [his] life,” that the “medication was withheld ‘shortly after’ [Erickson] had
commenced a treatment program that would take one year, that he was ‘still in
need of treatment for this disease,’ and that the prison officials were in the
meantime refusing to provide treatment.”246  According to the Court, “This
alone was enough to satisfy Rule 8(a)(2).”247  The Court also observed that the
238 FED. R. CIV. P. 26–37.
239 Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197 (2007) (per curiam).
240 Id. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104–05 (1976).
241 Erickson, 127 S. Ct. at 2199 (quoting Prisoner’s Complaint at 2, Erickson v. Pardus, No.
05-CV-00405-LTB-MJW, 2006 WL 650131 (D. Colo. Mar. 13, 2006) (No. 05-405)).
242 Id. See Erickson v. Pardus, No. 05-CV-00405-LTB-MJW, 2006 WL 650131 (D. Colo.
Mar. 13, 2006), aff’d 198 F. App’x 694 (10th Cir. 2006), vacated, 127 S. Ct. 2197 (2007)
(per curiam).
243 Erickson, 127 S. Ct. at 2200.
244 Id. (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
245 Id. (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007)).
246 Id. (quoting Prisoner’s Complaint, supra note 241, at 2–4).
247 Id.
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Tenth Circuit’s “departure from the liberal pleading standards set forth by Rule
8(a)(2)” was “even more pronounced,” because Erickson was proceeding pro
se, and a pro se complaint “is ‘to be liberally construed.’”248  The Court thus
vacated the Tenth Circuit’s judgment and remanded the case for further pro-
ceedings, noting that other issues raised by the prison officials’ motion to dis-
miss remained to be addressed.249
Coming only two weeks after abandoning Conley’s “no set of facts” lan-
guage, Erickson appears intended to signal that the Court does not mean for
Bell Atlantic to overthrow “the liberal pleading standards set forth by Rule
8(a)(2).”250  Rather, the Court viewed Conley’s “no set of facts” language as
going beyond the liberal standard of Rule 8(a)(2), and Bell Atlantic, with its
continued reference to Conley’s sometimes overlooked requirement of
“grounds,” in addition to “fair notice,”251 was meant as a corrective to Conley’s
“hyperbole.”252  The fact that the Court held the case under consideration while
Bell Atlantic was being written also indicates that it was intended to demon-
strate Bell Atlantic’s holding in operation.253
Reading Erickson as a key to interpreting Bell Atlantic suggests that the
type, complexity, size, and context of a case will influence how courts evaluate
“plausibility” under Rule 8(a)(2).  In Erickson, the plaintiff’s allegation that
removing him “from his prescribed hepatitis C medication was ‘endangering
[his] life’”254 was sufficient.  In Bell Atlantic, the plaintiffs’ allegation that the
Baby Bells “have entered into a contract, combination or conspiracy to prevent
competitive entry in their respective local . . . markets and have agreed not to
compete with one another”255 was not.
Why the easy judicial inference of harm in Erickson, but no judicial infer-
ence of conspiracy (in the teeth of a direct allegation) in Bell Atlantic? Erick-
son involved a state prisoner proceeding pro se.  His grievance (removal from a
hepatitis C medical treatment program) was straightforward, and the potential
for harm was readily apparent from the nature of his disease.256 Bell Atlantic,
248 Id. (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).
249 Id.  On remand, the Tenth Circuit reinstated the portions of its order and judgment
affirming the dismissal of Erickson’s other claims for deprivation of procedural due process
and deprivation of hygiene items, and remanded the case to the district court for further
proceedings on Erickson’s Eighth Amendment claim related to his removal from hepatitis C
treatment.  Erickson v. Pardus, No. 06-1114, 2007 WL 1636290 (10th Cir. June 7, 2007).
250 Erickson, 127 S. Ct. at 2200.
251 See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964–65 & n.3 (2007) (referring to
“fair notice” and “grounds”).
252 See JAMES, HAZARD & LEUBSDORF, supra note 85, at 190 (characterizing Conley’s “no
set of facts” language as “hyperbole”).
253 See Docket, Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197 (No. 06-7317), http://
www.supremecourtus.gov/docket/06-7317.htm; Ides, supra note 6, at 638 n.124 (quoting R
Posting of Amy Howe to SCOTUSblog, http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/uncategorized/
more-on-yesterdays-decision-in-no-06-7317-erickson-v-pardus/#more-5535 (June 5, 2007,
5:10 pm EDT)).
254 Erickson, 127 S. Ct. at 2200 (quoting Prisoner’s Complaint supra note 241, at 2).
255 Bell Atl. Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 1963 (quoting Consolidated Amended Complaint, supra
note 16, at 51).
256 The hepatitis C virus “is the leading cause of death from liver disease in the United
States.”  Doris B. Strader et al., Diagnosis, Management, and Treatment of Hepatitis C, 39
HEPATOLOGY, Apr. 2004, at 1147, 1147; Larry I. Lutwick, Hepatitis C in 3 GALE ENCYCLO-
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on the other hand, was brought by a large, sophisticated plaintiffs’ firm, pur-
ported to involve hundreds of millions of consumers and billions of dollars, and
concerned the vexing distinction between lawful parallel conduct and unlawful
conspiracy,257 a problem that can require millions of dollars of discovery to
resolve.258
Justice Stevens certainly seems to have a point when he describes the
Court’s conclusion that “so far as the Federal Rules are concerned, no agree-
ment has been alleged at all” as “mind-boggling.”259  What the disparate atti-
tudes in Bell Atlantic and Erickson suggest, however, is that the nature and size
of the case, the underlying substantive law, and the sophistication of the party
(or its counsel) attempting to satisfy the Rule 8 pleading standard all appear to
matter now even more than before.260  But if Bell Atlantic was meant as a
statement that federal notice pleading requires both “notice” and “grounds,”
Erickson is the period at the end of that statement.
PEDIA OF MEDICINE 1776, 1777–78 (Jacqueline L. Longe ed., 3d ed. 2006) (stating that
“roughly one-fifth” of persons developing hepatitis C would “recover completely . . . and
have no later problems,” but that others faced risk of “chronic liver infection and possibly
serious complications such as liver cancer”). See Powell v. City of Pittsfield,  221 F. Supp.
2d 119, 147 (D. Mass. 2002) (stating that “medical evidence . . . showed that hepatitis C
causes cirrhosis, liver failure, cancer, and death”).
257 See, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker, Two Sherman Act Section 1 Dilemmas:  Parallel Pricing,
the Oligopoly Problem, and Contemporary Economic Theory, 38 ANTITRUST BULL. 143,
144–45 (1993) (“The difficult issue of proving an agreement to fix prices from parallel
pricing and other circumstantial evidence is at the core of antitrust’s longstanding efforts to
attack the ‘oligopoly problem.’”); James Langenfeld & James Morsch, Refining the Matsu-
shita Standard and the Role Economics Can Play, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 507, 511 (2007)
(“[E]conomics teaches that it is difficult to infer a conspiracy only from market information
of parallel conduct in an oligopoly setting. . . .”); Thomas A. Paraino, Jr., Reconciling the
Harvard and Chicago Schools:  A New Antitrust Approach for the 21st Century, 82 IND. L.J.
345, 382 (2007) (“The courts and agencies have found it difficult to confirm when oligo-
polists have entered into illegal conspiracies rather than simply engaging in permissible par-
allel conduct.”).
258 See, e.g., Bell Atl. Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 1966–67 (discussing high cost of antitrust
discovery).
259 Id. at 1984. (Stevens, J., dissenting).  On the other hand, one can also read the Court as
concluding that the plaintiffs’ conspiracy allegation was nothing more than an unsupported,
pejorative “label” attached to the evidence pleaded of conscious parallelism, which alone is
insufficient to demonstrate a conspiracy. See id. at 1970 (“Although in form a few stray
statements speak directly of agreement, on fair reading these are merely legal conclusions
resting on the prior allegations.”) (footnote omitted).
260 Moreover, the Court’s unwillingness to infer conspiracy or agreement represents a clear
departure from Judge Clark’s views.  In Nagler v. Admiral Corp., Clark held that “the trier
of facts may draw an inference of agreement or concerted action from the ‘conscious paral-
lelism’ of the defendants’ acts of price cutting and the like, as the Supreme Court recog-
nizes.” Nagler v. Admiral Corp., 248 F.2d 319, 325 (2d Cir. 1957) (citing Theatre Enters. v.
Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 541 (1954)).  The split was hardly inadvertent,
however, for the Court noted its difference with Nagler in Bell Atlantic. See Bell Atl. Corp.,
127 S. Ct. at 1968 n.7 (noting that Nagler did not explain its citation to Theatre Enterprises,
and that, after intervening Supreme Court cases, “it is time for a fresh look at adequacy of
pleading when a claim rests on parallel action.”).
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CONCLUSION
In the wake of Bell Atlantic, some have expressed the “hope[ ] that trial
judges, long overworked but fearful of reversal by the circuit court, will now be
unshackled, free to dismiss the large number of meritless cases that clog dock-
ets and cost defendants untold losses in time and money.”261 Bell Atlantic does
suggest a greater willingness to dismiss cases at the pleading stage—especially
the “big cases” where “big” lawyers have plenty of time and talent to lay out
their cases adequately.  If the Plywood Antitrust/Car Carriers formulation of
the Rule 8(a)(2) pleading standard prevails, however, district courts will not be
“unshackled,” but will instead be more closely focused on the text of Rule
8(a)(2), particularly the requirement of showing “entitle[ment] to relief,”
instead of Conley v. Gibson’s now abrogated “hyperbole.”262
261 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 19:2at 19-6 (2008).
262 JAMES, HAZARD & LEUBSDORF, supra note 85, at 190.
